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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
since it tends to discourage dummy directors or directors who are
lax in attending to corporate affairs.
J. E. C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - CON-
STITUTIONALITY OF ACT EXTENDING BANKRUPTCY ACT TO COVER
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF STATES. - Petitioner, an irrigation dis-
trict organized under the laws of Texas,' presented a petition to
the District Court in accordance with the Sumners Act,2 amend-
ing the Bankruptcy Act 3 to provide for the relief of insolvent
political subdivisions of states by a readjustment of their obliga-
tions. The Act provided that a plan of readjustment should be
put in force if (1) the state consented, (2) two-thirds of the credi-
tors should agree to the plan, and (3) the district judge should con-
sider the plan to be a fair one. The state had consented ;4 thirty
per cent of the creditors had consented, and it was believed that
the requisite two-thirds would consent; but the district court dis-
missed the petition on the ground inter alia, that the Sumners Act
was unconstitutional.5 This decree was reversed in the circuit
court of appeals,0 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, that the Act was unconstitutional in that it impaired state
sovereignty. Four justices dissented. Petition for a rehearing
denied.7 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District
No. 1.8
The theory of the majority of the Court was that since it was
well established that the federal government and the governments
of the several states were each immune from taxation by the other,9
.Tzx. Cosxr. STAT. (Vernon, 1928) §§ 7622-7807.
2 48 STAT. 798 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-303 (Supp. 1934).
3 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq. (1927).
4 Tex. Laws 1935, c. 107.
G In re Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103
(1934).
O Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Ashton, S1 F. (2d)
905 (1936).
7 (1936) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 146.
8 56 S. Ct. 892, 80 L. Ed. 910 (1936).
9 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1819) ; Weston
v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. Ed. 481 (U. S. 1829); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall.
113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (U. S. 1870) ; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322,
21 L. Ed. 597 (U. S. 1873); Mercantile National Bank v. New York, 121 U.
S. 138, 7 S. Ct. 826 (1887); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.. 157 U. S.
429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 158 U. S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912 (1895); Ambrosini v. United
States, 187 U. S. 1, 23 S. Ct. 1 (1902); Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601 (1931); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 2S5
U. S. 393, 52 S. Ct. 443 (1932).
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Congress could not extend the Bankruptcy Act to cover the polit-
ical subdivisions of a state because the Congressional powers to
levy taxes10 and to enact uniform laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcies" are of equal rank in our scheme of government. In other
words, since Congress would be unable to pass an act levying a tax
upon the bonds of this irrigation district, Congress could not pass
an act enabling it to readjust its bonded indebtedness. That the
state was perfectly willing to allow Congress to impair its sov-
ereignty in this fashion made no difference because, in the first
place, consent by the states cannot enlarge the powers of Congress,
and, secondly, since a state cannot pass a law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts, 12 it may not indirectly achieve the same result by
permitting Congress to do so.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, in writing the majority opinion, ap-
parently disregarded a recent case which is directly in point. Batti-
more National Bank v. State Tax Commission l held that where an
Act of Congress subjected all shares of national banking institu-
tions to state taxation, national bank shares held by the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, admittedly an agency of the fed-
eral government, were taxable by a state. Hence a state may tax
the revenues of an agency of the federal government if the federal
government consents to the levy of such tax. It must necessarily
follow under Collector v. Daj'4 which lays down a rule that has
been followed in all subsequent cases on the point," i. o., that the
federal government and the several states are on an equal basis
in so far as immunity from taxation is concerned, that if the states
may tax the revenues of federal agencies upon consent being given
by the federal government, then the federal government may tax
state agencies if the state consents. Therefore, if the analogy of
the taxation cases be applied, the Sumners Act must be constitu-
tional because it is expressly provided in the Act that its terms shall
not apply unless the state consents. To accept the argument made
by Mr. Justice McReynolds in the principal case that consent by
0 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
11 U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
12 U. S. CONSr. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
13 297 U. S. 209, 56 S. Ct. 417 (1936).
14 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (1870).
15 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 158
U. S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912 (1895); Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 S. CL.
829 (1900); Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S. 1, 23 S. Ct. 1 (1902); Bur-
net v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 52 S. Ct. 443 (1932); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 56 S. Ct. 855, 865, 80 L. Ed. 749, 761 (1936).
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the state can not enlarge the powers of Congress, it is necessary to
repudiate either Collector v. Day and the large number of cases
which follow it or the Baltimore Bank case, the rule of which was
followed in British-American Oil Producing Compamy v. Board of
Equalization,16 a case decided after the principal case.
In regard to the argument that a state can not indirectly im-
pair the obligation of contracts by permitting Congress to do so,
it would seem just as logical to argue that since a state cannot coin
money, it may not indirectly achieve the same result by permitting
Congress to do so. The apparent intent here was merely to re-
iterate the argument that a state cannot enlarge the powers of Con-
gress by consent, which argument seems to be satisfactorily an-
swered by the Baltimore Bank case and the Producing Company
case when read in conjunction with the doctrine represented by
Collector v. Day.
Irrespective of the question of consent by the state, is the re-
adjustment of obligations of insolvent political subdivisions a
proper exercise of the power "To enact ... Uniform Laws on the
Subject of Bankruptcies "?17 Due to the fact that the states are
prohibited from passing laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts,"' the insolvent political subdivision may not look to the
state for aid, and, according to the principal case, it can expect no
relief from the federal government. Was it the thought of the
framers of the Constitution that here was a power so inherently
dangerous that it should be given to neither the states nor the fed-
eral government, but should be left to fall by some convenient way-
side?19
As Mr. Justice Cardozo points out in dissent, the average mar-
ket value of lands in the district was seventy-five dollars per acre
and the total bonded indebtedness per acre was approximately one
16 (1936) 4 U. S. L. "WEEK 387.
17 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
28 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10, el. 1.
19 See Sauer, An Experiment in MinicipaZ Refinancing: FacttaZ Background
of Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. One (1936)
5 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 1, wherein it is pointed out that up to the time the Su-
preme Court handed down its decision in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Im-
provement District No. 1 (supra n. 8). some seventy districts had filed petitions
for debt readjustment pursuant to the provisions of Section 80. Fifty of the
seventy cases had proceeded to a hearing on the petition and foity confirma-
tion decrees had been entered by some twenty-seven different United States
district court judges. In only one case, the Ashton case, was the constitution-
ality of the Act denied, and the decision of the district court to this effect was
reversed by the circuit court of appeals.
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hundred dollars. Suffice it to say that conditions were serious
enough that presumably over two-thirds of the bondholders were
willing to accept 49.8 cents on the dollar in satisfaction of their
claims. It does not seem sociologically desirable to hold in such a
case that the refusal of a very small minority of creditors to assent
to a plan of readjustment may place both the debtor district and
the majority of its creditors in a Daedalian Labyrinth with no hope
of release.
H. A. W., Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - BEM-UBEZZLEMENT - PROSECUTION OF RETAILER
FOR FAILURE TO TURN OVER SALES TAX. - A statute of Illinois im-
poses a tax upon motor fuel, the tax to be paid with the purchase
price by the autoist to the dealer. The dealer in gasoline is es-
pecially made by the statute the agent of the state to collect the tax
and is allowed the actual cost of making collection and payment.
The defendant, a dealer, failed to remit the tax under circumstances
tending to show animus furandi. He was indicted for embezzle-
ment. Defendant contended that a debtor-creditor relationship
existed and that the sole penalty was that provided by the statute,
a fine. Indictment quashed. People brought writ of error. Held,
that the relationship between the dealer and the state being that
of principal and agent and the penalty imposed by the act being
recoverable in the absence of intent to misappropriate, a dealer who
intentionally misappropriates the tax may properly be indicted for
embezzlement. People v. Kopman.1
On a similar set of facts in Wisconsin, the Illinois decision was
followed. The Wisconsin statute does not expressly declare the
agency nor allow the compensation. The court held this difference
in the statutes immaterial, saying that the fact of agency follows
from the declaration in both statutes that the tax is imposed for
the privilege of operating motor vehicles on the public highway
and therefore the express provision is unnecessary. Anderson v.
State.2
The similarity between the statutes involved in the Wisconsin
and Illinois cases, and the West Virginia Consumers Sales Tax "
is apparent. Should the retailer in West Virginia convert the tax,
in whole or in part, to his own use, might he be convicted of em-
1358 fIl. 479, 193 N. E. 516 (1934).
2 265 N. W. 210 (Wis. 1936).
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